# Switch Commitments: A Quantum Remedy for CT

Source URL: https://blog.blockstream.com/switch-commitments-a-quantum-remedy-for-ct
Updated: 2026-11-19T03:29:13.000Z
Author: Blockstream Team
Published: Nov 19, 2026
Category: Blockstream Research, Quantum

---

**TL;DR.** Liquid’s Confidential Transactions (CT) hide the amount and asset type of every transaction, but a large enough quantum computer could exploit the hidden amounts to create new coins nobody can see. Until now, preventing this meant forcing users to move their coins before a deadline or lose them. In our paper, we show that every Liquid coin already carries the data needed to check it under stricter rules, which a soft fork can activate if the threat becomes real. Users have nothing to do today, and no coins get burned. Even more, we have shown the same solution applies to other CT networks (Monero, Zano, Grin).

## The Shadow of the Quantum Threat

[Recent advances](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28846) in quantum computing have raised concerns among users of Bitcoin. One issue is that UTXOs with exposed public keys are vulnerable to unauthorized spending by attackers equipped with a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). To address this, the [SHRINCS BIP](https://github.com/SHRINCS/shrincs-bip) was recently proposed to provide users with a safe migration path. For Liquid, the situation is even worse: a quantum computer could break the math that keeps hidden amounts honest. By computing a single discrete logarithm on _secp256k1_, it could make a hidden amount appear to be any arbitrary value, causing uncontrollable inflation rather than merely stealing individual funds. A contentious remedy would be to set an expiration deadline for all unmigrated funds – effectively destroying the funds of anyone who fails to act in time.

## Switch Commitments by Coincidence

One proposed alternative to prevent forced expiration is [_switch commitments_](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/237.pdf). After a given deadline (or _the switch_), new _full_ verification rules for commitments are activated via a soft fork, preventing a quantum attacker from inflating the currency supply. However, proposed switch commitment constructions carry a major drawback: users are forced to deliberately migrate their coins before the switch. The only network that has intentionally deployed switch commitments is [Grin](https://grin.mw/), which is based on the Mimblewimble protocol. Grin activated a [variant of an _opt-in_ scheme](https://docs.grin.mw/wiki/miscellaneous/switch-commitments/), which, contrary to the original construction, targets the emergency scenario when no post-quantum CT scheme is ready at the moment of switch.

While other networks, such as Liquid and Monero, had not previously integrated switch commitments, our recent findings confirm that they can indeed be seamlessly upgraded without requiring any loss or forced migration of unmigrated funds. We solved this problem by demonstrating that each network already contains switch commitments by coincidence!

The reason is that the transaction sender must securely communicate the payment amount to the recipient. Typically, this is achieved using an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish a shared secret, which is then used to encrypt the amount. For instance, Liquid Network piggybacks this encrypted amount within every on-chain rangeproof, while Monero places the encrypted amount in a dedicated field. Notably, even a quantum attacker is unable to decrypt this encrypted amount to another value, thus the additional post-switch check of the decrypted value safeguards the currency supply. What initially seemed like a simple utility mechanism turns out to be a key asset for post-quantum security.

## The Switch

Because every unspent output already carries a switch commitment, the network can activate the switch – updating the verification rules via a soft fork – when the threat of a CRQC becomes imminent. Any user spending coins after the switch must supply additional information to satisfy the full verification conditions. In Liquid’s case, this is a rangeproof seed, allowing validators to confirm that the commitment opens to the exact amount encrypted within the rangeproof. Notably, this rule update is orthogonal to a future Post-Quantum Confidential Transaction protocol upgrade: if a new PQ-secure CT scheme becomes available before the switch, users can migrate their funds efficiently and privately without the overhead associated with full switch commitment verification.

### Privacy

Achieving post-quantum privacy is, however, trickier – a quantum attacker can retroactively break ECDH and recover hidden amounts and assets. To mitigate this risk and give users privacy-preserving migration paths we propose to additionally upgrade the key agreement mechanism with [hybrid key encapsulation](https://github.com/ElementsProject/ELIPs/pull/46).

We envision that users will be able to choose between two privacy trade-offs after the switch: either reveal the amount publicly to preserve their funds without additional fees, or provide a more expensive post-quantum zero-knowledge proof that passes full switch commitment verification while keeping the amount confidential.

## Technical Details

Blockstream Research published [a paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2173.pdf) that develops the technical details of coincidental switch commitments and formally proves their security for the instance deployed in Liquid. In addition, the paper formalizes Monero's instantiation of coincidental switch commitments and fixes a security proof gap for the opt-in scheme deployed in Grin. Consequently, effectively all deployed CT networks are quantum-upgradable outright!

## Blog Categories

- [All Posts](https://blog.blockstream.com/)
- [Blockstream Finance](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-finance)
- [Company](https://blog.blockstream.com/company)
- [Lightning Network](https://blog.blockstream.com/lightning-network)
- [Blockstream Mining](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-mining)
- [Blockstream Explorer](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-explorer)
- [Blockstream Satellite](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-satellite)
- [Liquid Network](https://blog.blockstream.com/liquid-network)
- [Blockstream Jade](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-jade)
- [Blockstream AMP](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-amp)
- [Blockstream App](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-app)
- [Blockstream Research](https://blog.blockstream.com/blockstream-research)
- [Cryptocurrency Data Feed](https://blog.blockstream.com/cryptocurrency-data-feed)
- [Elements](https://blog.blockstream.com/elements)
- [Layer-2 Roundup](https://blog.blockstream.com/layer-2-roundup)
- [Quarterly Report](https://blog.blockstream.com/quarterly-report)
- [Layer-2 Report](https://blog.blockstream.com/layer-2-report)
- [Simplicity Language](https://blog.blockstream.com/simplicity-language)
- [Quarterly Update](https://blog.blockstream.com/quarterly-update)
- [Quantum](https://blog.blockstream.com/quantum)
- [Enterprise](https://blog.blockstream.com/enterprise)
- [Insights](https://blog.blockstream.com/insights)
- [Simplicity](https://blog.blockstream.com/simplicity)
- [Developer](https://blog.blockstream.com/developer)
- [Security](https://blog.blockstream.com/security)
- [Jade](https://blog.blockstream.com/jade)
- [Liquid](https://blog.blockstream.com/liquid)
- [Lightning](https://blog.blockstream.com/lightning)
- [Research](https://blog.blockstream.com/research)
- [Core Lightning](https://blog.blockstream.com/core-lightning)
